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Abstract
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1 Introduction
Recently, negative interest rate policies have been implemented in Europe
and Japan (see, e.g., Bech and Malkhozov, 2016, and Angrick and Nemoto,
2017). Some economists presented positive views of negative nominal inter-
est rates, but others presented negative views. For example, using Old and
New Keynesian models, Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (2003) showed that paying
negative interest on currency (imposing a carry tax on currency) eliminates
the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates and, hence, is useful for elimi-
nating a liquidity trap.1 Without developing theoretical models, Goodfriend
(2000) suggested a carry tax on bank reserves as a way of overcoming the zero
lower bound, and Fukao (2005) proposed a tax on government-backed nan-
cial assets as a way to get the Japanese economy out of the stagnation that
it has been experiencing since the 1990s. Abo-Zaid and Garn (2016) showed
that the optimal nominal interest rate is negative in a New Keynesian model
with a borrowing constraint. Rognlie (2016) constructed a money-in-the-
utility-function model where the utility of money is saturated and showed
that the optimal interest rate is negative under price rigidity. Meanwhile,
Eggertsson et al. (2019) argued that lowering the nominal rate of interest on
bank reserves to negative values reduces commercial banks' prots and has
a contractionary eect on output. They developed a New Keynesian model
with a commercial banking sector and examined the eects of a negative
nominal interest rate in a short-run slump caused by a preference shock.
1In addition to paying negative interest on currency, Buiter (2010) proposed two ways
of overcoming the zero lower bound: abolishing currency and separating a numeraire
function from currency.
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It seems that the Euro zone and Japan, where negative interest rate
policies have been implemented, have not been in short-run but long-run
liquidity traps. It is well known that Japan has been in a prolonged liquidity
trap since the 1990s. Recently, there have been concerns that the Euro zone
may also have been in a prolonged liquidity trap. The purpose of this paper
is to theoretically analyze a negative interest rate policy in a permanent
liquidity trap.2 For this purpose, I extend the dynamic general equilibrium
model of Murota and Ono (2012) in two ways. First, I consider that negative
nominal interest is paid on excess bank reserves. In fact, the European
Central Bank and the Bank of Japan have imposed negative nominal interest
on excess reserves (see, e.g., Angrick and Nemoto, 2017). Second, I assume
that a tax is levied on commercial banks' vault cash holdings in order to
examine the eectiveness of a Gesell tax discussed by Goodfriend (2000),
Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (2003), and Fukao (2005).
As in Murota and Ono (2012), I present a permanent liquidity trap, where
nominal interest rates are stuck at their lower bounds, decient aggregate
demand creates unemployment, excess bank reserves arise, and the money
multiplier declines. Furthermore, even the price change rate is not in control
of the central bank; that is, deation can arise despite an increase in the
monetary base. These are the phenomena observed in Japan's liquidity trap
since the 1990s. In this permanent liquidity trap, I investigate the eects of
2Recently, economists have proposed several types of permanent stagnation. The causes
of permanent stagnation advocated by them are deleveraging shocks (Eggertsson and
Mehrotra, 2014; Eggertsson et al., 2016), wealth preferences (Michaillat and Saez, 2014;
Michau, 2018; Ono and Yamada, 2018), pessimistic expectations (Benigno and Fornaro,
2018), and liquidity preferences (Ono and Ishida, 2014; Illing et al., 2018; Murota, 2018;
Ono, 2018).
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a reduction in the nominal rate of interest on excess reserves, which is the
policy rate in the present model.
This paper shows that a reduction in the nominal rate of interest on ex-
cess reserves boosts an economy falling into the permanent liquidity trap
to the extent that it lowers the nominal deposit rate. It increases house-
hold consumption (aggregate demand), reduces unemployment, and raises
the price change rate. If the natural nominal interest rate is higher than
the lower bound set by the presence of vault cash, it can lower the nominal
deposit rate to the level of the natural nominal interest rate. Consequently,
the economy gets out of the permanent liquidity trap and reaches a normal
steady state. However, if the natural nominal interest rate is lower than
the lower bound, the economy cannot escape the permanent liquidity trap
no matter how negative the nominal rate of interest on excess reserves be-
comes. This is because the nominal deposit rate reaches the lower bound
and does not go down to the level of the natural nominal interest rate. In
this situation, where lowering the nominal rate of interest on excess reserves
becomes ineective, instead, a rise in the rate of tax on vault cash is useful
for pulling the economy out of the permanent liquidity trap because it allows
the nominal deposit rate to fall to the level of the natural nominal interest
rate. This is consistent with the suggestions by Goodfriend (2000), Buiter
and Panigirtzoglou (2003), and Fukao (2005). In the present model, however,
levying a tax on currency held by the public, which is practically dicult, is
not required for overcoming the lower bound.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the model of an econ-
omy. Section 3 shows the dynamic system of the economy. Section 4 presents
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a normal steady state as a benchmark. Sections 5 and 6 discuss the eects
of a negative interest rate policy in a permanent liquidity trap. Section 7
concludes this paper.
2 Model
This section extends the dynamic general equilibrium model of Murota and
Ono (2012).3 Excess bank reserves bear nominal interest, which can be
negative. Commercial banks hold vault cash, and a tax is levied on vault
cash holdings. In addition, I provide a microfoundation for nominal wage
stickiness by modifying the fair wage setting of Raurich and Sorolla (2014).
2.1 Household
A representative household derives utility not only from cash but also from
bank deposits.4 The lifetime utility of this household isZ 1
0
[u(ct) + v(m
h
t ; dt)  ntf(et)] exp( t)dt;
where  (> 0) is the subjective discount rate. u(ct) denotes the utility of
consumption ct and satises
u0(ct) > 0; u00(ct) < 0; u0(0) =1; u0(1) = 0: (1)
v(mht ; dt) denotes the utility of real cash holdings m
h
t ( Mht =Pt) and
real deposit holdings dt ( Dt=Pt), where Mht is nominal cash holdings, Dt
3Murota and Ono (2012) did not consider vault cash or interest paid on bank reserves
and assumed nominal wage stickiness without microfoundations.
4Romer (1985), Jones et al. (2004), and Agenor and Alper (2012) also assumed that
both cash and deposits provide utility. See Buiter (2010, p. 222) for a somewhat similar
assumption.
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is nominal deposit holdings, and Pt is the price level. v(m
h
t ; dt) is linear
homogeneous and satises
@v
@mht
 vm(mht ; dt) > 0;
@2v
@mht
2 < 0; vm(0; dt) =1; vm(1; dt) = 0;
@v
@dt
 vd(mht ; dt) > 0;
@2v
@dt
2 < 0; vd(m
h
t ; 0) =1; vd(mht ;1) = 0:
The cash{deposit ratio is dened by xt:
xt  m
h
t
dt
: (2)
Then the marginal utility of cash and of deposits are expressed as functions
of xt:
vm(m
h
t ; dt)  vm(xt); vd(mht ; dt)  vd(xt);
and the above-mentioned properties of v(mht ; dt) are rewritten as follows:
v0m(xt) < 0; vm(0) =1; vm(1) = 0;
v0d(xt) > 0; vd(0) = 0; vd(1) =1:
(3)
 ntf(et) denotes the disutility of eort, where nt is the amount of em-
ployed labor, et is eort per unit of employed labor, and  f(et) is the disu-
tility of eort per unit of employed labor. Following Raurich and Sorolla
(2014), I assume a quadratic disutility function:5
 ntf(et) =  nt

et   e(Wt=WRt )
2
;
where Wt is the nominal wage, W
R
t is the nominal reference wage, and
e(Wt=W
R
t ) is the norm of eort and where the household takes nt, Wt, and
WRt as given. Furthermore, following them, I assume that the reference wage
5Akerlof (1982), Collard and de la Croix (2000), Danthine and Kurmann (2004), and
Vaona (2013) also assumed quadratic disutility functions in eciency wage models.
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is given by the weighted average of past social averages of income. However,
unlike them, the reference wage consists of nominal wages, not real wages,
as follows:
WRt 
Z t
 1
Is exp( (t  s))ds; (4)
where  is a positive constant and where Is is the social average of nominal
income dened such that
Is  Wsns + Ws(n
f   ns)
nf
; (5)
where nf is the labor endowment that the household inelastically supplies,
nf ns is unemployment, and Ws(nf ns) is unemployment benets received
by the household ( is the replacement rate satisfying 0 <  < 1).
The budget constraint in real terms is
_at = r
D
t dt   tmht + wtnt + wt(nf   nt)  ct   st; (6)
where at is real asset holdings, r
D
t is the real rate of interest on deposits,
t ( _Pt=Pt) is the rate of price change, wt ( Wt=Pt) is the real wage, and
st is a lump-sum tax or transfer. The components of at are cash and deposits:
at = m
h
t + dt: (7)
The current-value Hamiltonian Ht for the utility-maximization problem
is
Ht = u(ct) + v(m
h
t ; dt)  nt

et   e(Wt=WRt )
2
+ t

rDt dt   tmht + wtnt + wt(nf   nt)  ct   st

+ t
 
at  mht   dt

;
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where t is the costate variable associated with (6) and t is the Lagrange
multiplier associated with (7). The rst-order conditions with respect to ct,
mht , dt, at, and et are
u0(ct) = t;
vm(xt)  tt = t;
vd(xt) + r
D
t t = t;
_t   t =  t;
et = e(Wt=W
R
t ):
(8)
The transversality condition is
lim
t!1
tat exp( t) = 0: (9)
The last equation of (8) shows that in contrast with Raurich and Sorolla
(2014), eort et depends on nominal wages (not real wages).
6 I assume that
e0(Wt=WRt ) > 0; e
00(Wt=WRt ) < 0:
The assumption that e0() > 0 implies that as a rm pays a higher nominal
wage compared with the nominal reference wage (which is the criterion for
judging fairness), the household provides greater eort in return. There
are empirical ndings consistent with this assumption. Kahneman et al.
(1986) and Blinder and Choi (1990) found evidence of money illusion that
people tend to judge fairness in terms of nominal wages. Shar et al. (1997)
and Mees and Franses (2014) also found evidence of money illusion that
nominal wages tend to inuence worker morale. Moreover, Campbell and
Kamlani (1997), Bewley (1999), and Kawaguchi and Ohtake (2007) found
6Raurich and Sorolla (2014) analyzed the relationship between real wage stickiness and
economic growth in a neoclassical growth model where eort depends on real wages.
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that reductions in nominal wages decrease worker morale. The assumption
that e00() < 0 is required for the second-order condition for the rm's prot-
maximization problem. See Murota (2016) for a somewhat similar eort
function where eort depends on nominal wages because of money illusion.
From (8) except the last equation, I obtain
+ (ct)
_ct
ct
+ t =
vm(xt)
u0(ct)
= RDt +
vd(xt)
u0(ct)
; (10)
where (ct)   u00(ct)ct=u0(ct) and RDt ( rDt + t) is the nominal rate of
interest on deposits. According to (10), the household decides to consume or
save and allocates wealth between cash and deposits. Equation (10) implies
that even when the nominal deposit rate RDt is negative, the marginal utility
of cash vm() can be positive owing to the presence of the marginal utility of
deposits vd(). This makes equilibrium with negative nominal interest rates
feasible.
2.2 Firm
The production function of a representative rm is linear as follows:
yt = etnt = e(Wt=W
R
t )nt; (11)
where yt is output, eort et is labor productivity, and nt is labor input. The
rm chooses nt and Wt to maximize its prot:
Pte(Wt=W
R
t )nt  Wtnt;
where the rm takes Pt and W
R
t as given because the goods market is per-
fectly competitive and because the reference wage consists of the social av-
9
erages of income. The rst-order conditions with respect to nt and Wt are
7
e(Wt=W
R
t ) =
Wt
Pt
; (12)
Pte
0(Wt=WRt )
WRt
= 1: (13)
Eliminating Pt from (12) and (13) yields a modied Solow condition:
(Wt=W
R
t )e
0(Wt=WRt )
e(Wt=WRt )
= 1; (14)
which gives Wt=W
R
t as a constant. Denoting it by !:
Wt
WRt
 !; (15)
I nd that eort (labor productivity) is constant:
et = e(Wt=W
R
t ) = e(!)  e: (16)
2.3 Commercial Bank
A representative commercial bank collects deposits Dt from the household
and buys government bonds Bt, which bears nominal interest at the rate R
B
t .
In this regard, however, the commercial bank is required to put an amount
of money greater than or equal to a portion of the deposits in the central
bank as bank reserves:
M bt  Dt; (17)
7Under the linear production technology, the rm chooses labor input and output as
follows:
nt =1; yt =1 if e(Wt=WRt ) > Wt=Pt;
0 < nt <1; 0 < yt <1 if e(Wt=WRt ) = Wt=Pt;
nt = 0; yt = 0 if e(Wt=W
R
t ) < Wt=Pt:
Since Wt is determined by the rm so as to satisfy (13), Pt exibly falls (rises) so as to
eliminate excess supply (excess demand) in the perfectly competitive goods market when
yt =1 (yt = 0). Consequently, (12) is satised.
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whereM bt is bank reserves (commercial bank's deposits with the central bank)
and  is the required reserve ratio (0 <  < 1). Unlike Murota and Ono
(2012), I consider that excess reserves (M bt   Dt) bear nominal interest at
the rate R, which is the policy rate and an exogenous variable controlled
by the central bank. In the present model, a negative interest rate policy
indicates the case of
R < 0:
Moreover, unlike them, I take into consideration vault cash. Besides Bt and
M bt , the commercial bank can hold vault cash Zt:
Zt  0: (18)
Naturally, the nominal rate of interest on vault cash is zero. In sum, the
following relationship holds:
Bt +M
b
t + Zt = Dt: (19)
The relationship between bank reserves and vault cash varies in dierent
countries. For example, in Japan, vault cash is not included in bank reserves
(bank reserves consist only of commercial banks' deposits with the Bank of
Japan),8 which means that (17) holds. In contrast, in the USA, both vault
cash and deposits with Federal Reserve Banks are included in bank reserves,9
which means that the equation M bt +Zt  Dt holds instead of (17). I adopt
(17) because Japan is the country that has implemented a negative interest
rate policy.10
8See http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/education/oshiete/seisaku/b33.htm/.
9See https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/reservereq.htm.
10To be more precise, the Bank of Japan has imposed negative interest on a fraction of
excess reserves (see, e.g., Angrick and Nemoto, 2017).
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The commercial bank's prot-maximization problem is as follows:
maxRBt Bt +R(M
b
t   Dt)  Zt  RDt Dt;
s.t. M bt  Dt; Zt  0; Bt +M bt + Zt = Dt;
where  is the rate of tax on vault cash. The presence of the cost of holding
vault cash plays an important role in considering negative nominal interest
rates. Given RBt and R
D
t , the commercial bank chooses Bt, M
b
t , Zt, and
Dt to maximize its prot. The Lagrange function Lt for this maximization
problem is
Lt = R
B
t Bt +R(M
b
t   Dt)  Zt  RDt Dt
+ t(M
b
t   Dt) + tZt + t(Dt  Bt  M bt   Zt);
where t, t, and t are the Lagrange multipliers associated with (17), (18),
and (19), respectively. The rst-order conditions are
RBt = t;
R + t = t;
  + t = t;
RDt = t   (R + t);
t  0; M bt   Dt  0; t(M bt   Dt) = 0;
t  0; Zt  0; tZt = 0:
(20)
From (20), I obtain
RBt  R; M bt   Dt  0; (RBt  R)(M bt   Dt) = 0;
RBt   ; Zt  0; (RBt + )Zt = 0:
(21)
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From (21), the lower bound on RBt is given by the high side of R and   :11;12
RBt  maxfR; g; (22)
which implies that the lower bound is created by the presence of excess
reserves and vault cash.
In what follows, I consider the case of
R >  : (23)
The case of R <   is analyzed later in Section 6. In the case of (23), from
(22), the lower bound on RBt is R:
RBt  R >  ;
which means that vault cash is less protable than government bonds and
excess reserves. Therefore, as is clear from (21), the commercial bank does
not hold vault cash:
Zt = 0; (24)
i.e., (18) is binding (t > 0).
In the case of (23), in contrast with (18), (17) is either binding or non-
binding. When (17) is binding (t > 0), i.e., the commercial bank does not
hold excess reserves:
M bt = Dt; (25)
11If RBt < maxfR; g (government bonds are less protable than excess reserves or
vault cash), the commercial bank by no means buys government bonds. In this case,
RBt rises to a level higher than or equal to maxfR; g so that the government gets the
commercial bank to buy bonds. Consequently, (22) holds.
12In Murota and Ono (2012), where R =  = 0, the lower bound on RBt is zero.
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from (20) I obtain
RBt > R; R
D
t = (1  )RBt > (1  )R (26)
and from (19), (24), and (25) I get
Dt =
Bt
1  ; M
b
t =

1  Bt: (27)
Meanwhile, when (17) is not binding (t = 0), i.e., the commercial bank
holds excess reserves:
M bt   Dt > 0;
from (20) I obtain
RBt = R; R
D
t = (1  )RBt = (1  )R: (28)
In other words, excess reserves arise when the return on excess reserves equals
that on government bonds. From (26) and (28), I nd that independently
of whether (17) is binding (excess reserves arise), the following relationship
holds:
RDt = (1  )RBt ; (29)
where the left-hand side (LHS) and the right-hand side (RHS) denote the
marginal cost of and the marginal revenue of collecting deposits, respectively,
and that the lower bound on RDt is (1  )R:
RDt  (1  )R:
Note that from (24), (26), and (27) or from (19), (24), and (28) the prot of
the commercial bank is zero:
RBt Bt +R(M
b
t   Dt)  Zt  RDt Dt = 0: (30)
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2.4 Government and Central Bank
Besides controlling the nominal rate of interest on excess reserves, R, the cen-
tral bank increases or decreases the nominal monetary base Mt at a constant
rate :
_Mt
Mt
= ;
which implies that the real monetary base mt ( Mt=Pt) evolves according
to
_mt
mt
=   t: (31)
The budget constraint of the government in nominal terms is
_Bt + _Mt + Ptst + Zt  R(M bt   Dt) = RBt Bt + Wt(nf   nt) + Ptg;
where g is government purchases and where  R(M bt   Dt) denotes the gov-
ernment revenue arising from negative interest on excess reserves whenR < 0.
In real terms, it is
_bt + mt + st + zt  R(mbt   dt) = rBt bt + wt(nf   nt) + g; (32)
where bt ( Bt=Pt) is real government bonds, zt ( Zt=Pt) is real vault cash
holdings, mbt ( M bt =Pt) is real reserve holdings, and rBt ( RBt   t) is the
real rate of interest on government bonds. To prevent bt from diverging, the
government collects the lump-sum tax st according to
st = r
B
t bt + wt(n
f   nt) + g +R(mbt   dt)  zt   mt + (bt   b);
where  is a positive constant and b is the target level of real government
bonds. Substituting this equation into (32) yields the law of motion for bt:
_bt =  (bt   b): (33)
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3 Dynamics
This section derives the dynamic system of the economy. From (4), (5), and
(15), the nominal wage changes according to13
_Wt
Wt
=
_WRt
WRt
= 

It
WRt
  1

= 

!(1  )nt + !nf
nf
  1

= 

nt   n
nf

;
(34)
where  and n are positive constants dened such that
  !(1  ); n 

1  !
!(1  )

nf < nf ;
where the inequality is established by the assumption that ! > 1.14 From
(34), I nd15
d( _Wt=Wt)
dnt
=

nf
> 0;
which is produced as follows. An increase in employment nt leads to an
increase in It=W
R
t and, hence, to a rise in _W
R
t =W
R
t . This rise in the reference
wage puts downward pressure on eort (@e(Wt=W
R
t )=@W
R
t < 0). Since the
13Murota (2016, 2018) derived nominal wage stickiness similar to (34) in a discrete time
model where worker morale depends on the current and last nominal wages and on the
unemployment rate and in a model where labor unions are concerned about nominal wages
and employment, respectively.
14For example, if the eort function is logarithmic:
e(Wt=W
R
t ) = ln(Wt=W
R
t );
then from (14) the assumption that ! > 1 is satised:
! = e = 2:71828    > 1:
15The rate of change in the nominal wage _Wt=Wt is related negatively to the unemploy-
ment rate (nf   nt)=nf (i.e., a Phillips curve appears):
_Wt
Wt
=  

nf   nt
nf

+ 

nf   n
nf

:
16
rm raises the nominal wage in order to maintain labor productivity at the
optimal level, _Wt=Wt rises at the same rate as _W
R
t =W
R
t .
In the case of (23), where the commercial bank does not hold vault cash
(see (24)), the money market equilibrium condition is
mht +m
b
t = mt: (35)
Supply equals demand in the goods market as follows:16
ct + g = yt = ent: (36)
From (12), (16), (34), and (36), the price change rate is
t =
_Wt
Wt
= 

nt   n
nf

= 

ct + g   y
yf

; (37)
where
y  en; yf  enf ; (38)
where yf denotes full employment output. From (31) and (37), the law of
motion for mt is
_mt
mt
=   t =   

ct + g   y
yf

: (39)
From the rst equality of (10) and (37), the law of motion for ct is
_ct
ct
= (ct)
 1

 

ct + g   y
yf

+
vm(xt)
u0(ct)
  

: (40)
When (17) is binding (the commercial bank does not hold excess reserves),
from (2), (27), and (35), xt in (40) is expressed by bt and mt:
xt =
mht
dt
= (1  )mt
bt
  : (41)
16Equation (36) is derived from (6), (7), (11), (12), (16), (19), (24), (30), (31), (32), and
(35).
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When (17) is not binding (the commercial bank holds excess reserves), from
the second equality of (10) into which (28) is substituted:
vm(xt)
u0(ct)
= (1  )R + vd(xt)
u0(ct)
; (42)
xt in (40) is given as a function of ct and R:
xt = x(ct;R); (43)
which satises17
x(0;R) =1 if R < 0; x(0;R) = x if R = 0; x(0;R) = 0 if R > 0; (44)
where x is a value satisfying vm(x) = vd(x). In addition, xt satises
18
@xt
@ct
< 0 if R < 0;
@xt
@ct
= 0 if R = 0;
@xt
@ct
> 0 if R > 0; (45)
@xt
@R
=
(1  )u0(ct)
v0m(xt)  v0d(xt)
< 0; (46)
where the inequality of (46) is established by (1) and (3). In sum, the dynamic
system consists of (33), (39), and (40) with (41) or (43).
17Arranging (42) yields
vm(xt)  vd(xt)
u0(ct)
= (1  )R;
where the RHS is a nite constant and the denominator of the LHS is innity when ct = 0
(u0(0) = 1 from (1)). If R < 0, for the equality to be satised, then the numerator of
the LHS must be minus innity when ct = 0. Therefore, when ct = 0, from (3) I have
xt = 1 (the numerator is vm(1)   vd(1) = 0   1 =  1). If R > 0, I have xt = 0
(vm(0)  vd(0) =1) because the numerator of the LHS must be plus innity.
18From (42), I derive
@xt
@ct
=
u00(ct) [vm(xt)  vd(xt)]
u0(ct) [v0m(xt)  v0d(xt)]
=
(1  )Ru00(ct)
v0m(xt)  v0d(xt)
:
Taking (1) and (3) into account, I obtain the signs of @xt=@ct in (45).
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4 Normal Steady State
Prior to dealing with a permanent liquidity trap, in this section, I consider
a normal steady state, where the nominal interest rates RB and RD are
above the lower bounds R and (1   )R, respectively, and where there is
no aggregate demand deciency. From (33), (39), and (40) where _bt = 0,
_mt = 0, and _ct = 0, the normal steady state is represented by
b = b;  =  = 

c + g   y
yf

; +  =
vm(x
)
u0(c)
; (47)
where the asterisk is attached to endogenous variables. Throughout this
paper, I assume that  >  . The existence of this steady state is easily
shown. The real bond b and the price change rate  are straightforwardly
determined by the rst and second equations of (47). From (36), (38), and
the second equation of (47), consumption and employment are
c =


yf + y   g; n = 

nf + n: (48)
The second equation of (48) implies the existence of unemployment as follows:
nf   n > 0 if  < 

nf   n
nf

:
Moreover, from (48), I nd a crowding-out eect of government purchases g:
dc
dg
=  1; dn

dg
= 0;
which implies that there is no aggregate demand deciency, i.e., the eciency
wage is the only cause of unemployment in the normal steady state.
As shown in Figure 1, when
+  >
vm(x(c
;R))
u0(c)
; (49)
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where from (42) and (43) x(c;R) is the cash{deposit ratio when c = c
and RD = (1  )R, the cash{deposit ratio x in the last equation of (47) is
determined so as to satisfy
x < x(c;R); (50)
and the nominal deposit rate RD is determined so as to be higher than its
lower bound (1  )R:
vm(x
)
u0(c)
  vd(x
)
u0(c)
=

RD > (1  )R

=
vm(x(c
;R))
u0(c)
  vd(x(c
;R))
u0(c)

;
(51)
which straightforwardly results from  RD <  (1  )R in Figure 1.19 Note
that the equalities of (51) are obtained from the second equality of (10) and
that the properties of vm(x) and vd(x) in (3) yield (50) and (51) under (49).
From (29) and (51), the government bond rate RB is determined so as to be
higher than its lower bound R and is dened by R:
R <
RD
1   = R
B  R: (52)
Then RD is expressed as
RD = (1  )R:
Thus, in the normal steady state, the optimality condition of the household,
(10), holds as follows:
+  =
vm(x
)
u0(c)
= (1  )R + vd(x
)
u0(c)
: (53)
Since R and (1   )R are the nominal interest rates that hold in the
normal steady state where RB and RD are higher than their lower bounds
19Figure 1 shows the case where RD is negative, but RD can be negative or positive.
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and where aggregate demand is not decient, I regard R and (1   )R
as natural nominal interest rates. In the present model, nominal interest
rates rather than real interest rates are important because the cash{deposit
ratio, which is aected by the nominal deposit rate (not the real deposit
rate), plays a crucial role in determining whether the economy falls into a
permanent liquidity trap (see Section 5). From (48) and (53), R is given by
R =
vm(x
)  vd(x)
(1  )u0


yf + y   g
 ; (54)
where x is
x = v 1m

(+ )u0


yf + y   g

: (55)
From (54) and (55), I nd that R is independent of the nominal rate of
interest on excess reserves, R, and the rate of tax on vault cash,  , and that
if , , and g are suciently small and yf and y are suciently large, then
the natural nominal interest rate is negative:20
R < 0:
Moreover, R has the following property.
Lemma 1. Equation (49) is necessary and sucient for (52).
20From (55), I obtain
@x
@
=
u0
v0m
< 0;
@x
@
=  y
f (+ )u00
2v0m
< 0;
@x
@g
=   (+ )u
00
v0m
< 0;
@x
@yf
=
(+ )u00
v0m
> 0;
@x
@y
=
(+ )u00
v0m
> 0:
Hence, from (3) and (54), I have R < 0 if , , and g are suciently small and yf and
y are suciently large. Note that the inuence of  on R is unclear because the sign of
@x=@ is ambiguous: @x=@ = [u0 + (+ )yfu00]=(v0m).
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Proof. Since from (3) vm(x) is a monotonically decreasing function of x, using
the last equation of (47), I nd
(49) () (50):
Taking into account that from (3) vm(x) vd(x) is a monotonically decreasing
function of x, I have
(50) () (51):
Thus, (49) is necessary and sucient for (51). Since (51) is equivalent to
(52), I obtain
(49) () (52):
I formally state the existence of the normal steady state in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1. When (23) and (52) hold:
R >  ; R < R;
there exists the normal steady state represented by (47).
In the normal steady state, where RB = R > R, from (21) excess reserves
do not arise (MB = D), which implies that the money multiplier is larger
than one:
Mh +D
M
=
(mh=d) + 1
(mh=d) + (mb=d)
=
x + 1
x + 
> 1:
Now, I investigate the eects of monetary policies in the normal steady
state. From (47) and (48), a rise in the money growth rate  increases
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consumption, employment, and the price change rate:
dc
d
=
yf

> 0;
dn
d
=
nf

> 0;
d
d
= 1 > 0;
where the eects of a rise in  on c and n become stronger as the nominal
wage becomes more sticky (i.e.,  decreases). This implies that the cause of
the increases in c and n is nominal wage stickiness. Meanwhile, from (47)
and (48), I obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2. A change in the nominal rate of interest on excess reserves,
R, does not aect consumption, employment, or the price change rate:
dc
dR
= 0;
dn
dR
= 0;
d
dR
= 0:
The reason for this ineectiveness is that the nominal deposit rate RD is not
aected by a change in R (RD is not stuck at the lower bound (1  )R).
5 Permanent Liquidity Trap
This section considers the case where the household's desire for savings is so
excessive that (49) is not true:
+  <
vm(x(c
;R))
u0(c)

= (1  )R + vd(x(c
;R))
u0(c)

; (56)
i.e., the natural nominal interest rate is so low that (52) is not true:
R > R: (57)
Note that as inferred from Lemma 1, (56) is necessary and sucient for (57).
In this case, as shown in Figure 2, for the normal steady state to exist (for
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Point A in Figure 2 to be attained), the equation  RD >  (1   )R must
hold, i.e., the nominal deposit rate must be below its lower bound:
RD < (1  )R:
Naturally, this is infeasible. Hence, it turns out that under (56) the normal
steady state does not exist. Then, what is the state that the economy reaches
if (56) is true?
Equation (56) implies that the household prefers saving cash and deposits
to consuming when c = c, RD = (1   )R, and x = x(c;R).21 This desire
for savings is not suppressed by a decline in the nominal deposit rate (the
consequent rise in the cash{deposit ratio) because the nominal deposit rate
already reaches the lower bound (1   )R (the cash{deposit ratio already
reaches the upper bound x(c;R)).22 Thus, in contrast with (53) in the
normal steady state, the optimality condition of the household, (10), is not
satised by the adjustment of the nominal deposit rate and the cash{deposit
ratio. A reduction in consumption is required for satisfying (10). That
is, the ungratied desire to save cash and deposits causes the household to
decrease consumption to less than c. This consumption deciency creates
unemployment. Consequently, the economy reaches a stagnation steady state
where the nominal interest rates RB and RD are stuck at the respective lower
bounds R and (1   )R, consumption (aggregate demand) is decient, and
unemployment worsens. In addition, as described below, an increase in the
21In (56), + intuitively denotes the degree of preference for consumption. Naturally,
higher  causes the household to save less and consume more. Also higher , which means
higher  when c = c, urges the household to consume more because it implies a fall in
the price of the present good relative to the price of the future good.
22From (46), a decline in the nominal deposit rate RD (= (1   )R) leads to a rise in
the cash{deposit ratio x(c;R).
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monetary base is ineective (even the price change rate is not aected),
excess reserves arise, and the money multiplier decreases to one. In short,
the economy falls into a permanent liquidity trap. From (33), (39), and (40)
with (43), this permanent liquidity trap is represented by
b = b;
_m
m
=   =  

c+ g   y
yf

> 0; +

c+ g   y
yf

=
vm(x(c;R))
u0(c)
;
(58)
where
c < c; RB = R; RD = (1  )R:
Recall that from (28), (42), and (43) RB and RD are R and (1  )R, respec-
tively, when the cash{deposit ratio is x(c;R).
Let me examine the existence of this permanent liquidity trap. As in the
normal steady state, from the rst equation of (58), the real bond b is given
by b. Meanwhile, consumption c is determined by the last equation of (58) so
as to be lower than the level of the normal steady state c as follows. Using
the rst equation of (48) and (56), I nd that in the last equation of (58) the
LHS is smaller than the RHS at c = c:
+ 

c + g   y
yf

= +  <
vm(x(c
;R))
u0(c)
:
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Therefore, if the LHS is larger than the RHS at c = 0:23
+ 

g   y
yf

> 0 if R  0; + 

g   y
yf

> (1  )R if R > 0; (59)
at least one value of c satisfying the last equation of (58), denoted by ~c, exists
between 0 and c:
0 < ~c < c:
Furthermore, if the slope of the LHS is smaller than that of the RHS at
c = ~c:24

yf
<
v0m(x(~c;R))
u0(~c)
 @x(~c;R)
@~c
  vm(x(~c;R))u
00(~c)
[u0(~c)]2
 f(~c;R); (60)
then ~c is unique (Figure 3 illustrates the unique existence of ~c in the case
of R  0).25 Hence, in contrast with (53) in the normal steady state, the
optimality condition of the household, (10), holds as follows:
+ 

~c+ g   y
yf

=
vm(x(~c;R))
u0(~c)
= (1  )R + vd(x(~c;R))
u0(~c)
: (61)
Using (36) and (37), I nd that the consumption deciency (~c < c) makes
employment ~n and the price change rate ~ in the permanent liquidity trap
23When c = 0, from (1), (3), (42), (43), and (44), the RHS of (58) is
vm(x(0;R))
u0(0)
= 0 if R  0; vm(x(0;R))
u0(0)
= (1  )R if R > 0;
where
vd(x(0;R))
u0(0)
=  (1  )R > 0 if R  0; vd(x(0;R))
u0(0)
= 0 if R > 0:
24From (1), (3), and (45), whereas the rst term of f(~c;R) is positive if R < 0, it is
negative if R > 0 and vanishes if R = 0. However, the second term is always positive,
which allows f(~c;R) to satisfy the inequality of (60) even if R  0.
25In the case of R > 0, the only dierence from Figure 3 is that the intercept of the
RHS is not zero but (1  )R.
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lower than the levels of the normal steady state:
~n =
~c+ g
e
<
c + g
e
= n; ~ = 

~c+ g   y
yf

< 

c + g   y
yf

=  = :
(62)
The rst equation of (62) implies that unemployment in the permanent liq-
uidity trap is nf   ~n, which is the sum of unemployment created by the
consumption deciency, n  ~n, and unemployment created by the eciency
wage, nf  n. The second equation of (62) implies that ~ can be positive or
negative and that the real monetary base permanently increases (m = 1),
as shown by the second equation of (58).26 Taking m = 1 into account,
from (2), (19), (24), and (35), I nd that real cash holdings mh, real deposit
holdings d, and real bank reserves mb also increase to innity:
mh =
x(~c;R)(m+ b)
1 + x(~c;R)
=1; d = m+ b
1 + x(~c;R)
=1; mb = m  x(~c;R)b
1 + x(~c;R)
=1:
(63)
Although household's wealth holdings increase to innity (a = mh+d =1),
household consumption remains insucient (c = ~c < c). This is why the
liquidity trap is permanent. I summarize the above discussion in the following
proposition.
26From (7), the rst equation of (8), (19), (24), (35), and (58), I obtain
at = mt + bt; lim
t!1t = u
0(~c); lim
t!1 bt = b; limt!1

_mt
mt
  

=   vm(x(~c;R))
u0(~c)
:
Therefore, when  is so low as to satisfy
 <
vm(x(~c;R))
u0(~c)
;
the rate of growth in mt is lower than , and the transversality condition (9) is satised:
lim
t!1tat exp( t) = u
0(~c)
h
lim
t!1mt exp( t) + limt!1 bt exp( t)
i
= 0:
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Proposition 3. When (23) and (57) hold:
R >  ; R > R;
there exists the permanent liquidity trap represented by (58).
In this liquidity trap, from (21), excess reserves appear (M b   D > 0)
because the government bond rate equals the nominal rate of interest on
excess reserves (RB = R). The presence of excess reserves decreases the
money multiplier to one:
Mh +D
M
=
(mh=d) + 1
(mh=d) + (mb=d)
= 1;
where from (63) the reserve{deposit ratio is
mb
d
= lim
m!1
1  (x(~c;R)b=m)
1 + (b=m)
= 1:
The eects of scal and monetary policies in the permanent liquidity
trap are in contrast to those in the normal steady state. From (60), the
rst equality of (61), and (62), an increase in government purchases g raises
consumption, employment, and the price change rate:
d~c
dg
=
=yf
f(~c;R)  (=yf ) > 0;
d~n
dg
=
1
e

d~c
dg
+ 1

> 0;
d~
dg
=

yf

d~c
dg
+ 1

> 0:
The reason why an increase in government purchases boosts consumption is
that it raises the price change rate (it lowers the price of the present good
relative to the price of the future good). Hence, if the price is xed ( = 0),
the eect of g vanishes (d~c=dg = 0). In contrast with an increase in g, from
the rst equality of (61) and (62), a rise in the money growth rate  has no
eect:
d~c
d
= 0;
d~n
d
= 0;
d~
d
= 0:
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It is noteworthy that even the price change rate is not aected, which implies
that deation (~ < 0) can arise despite a monetary expansion ( > 0). See
Ono and Ishida (2014) and Murota (2016, 2018) for similar eects of scal
and monetary expansions in stagnation steady states.
Whereas a rise in  is ineective, a change in the nominal rate of interest
on excess reserves, R, aects the economy. Totally dierentiating the rst
equality of (61) yields
d~c
dR
=  v
0
m(x(~c;R))
u0(~c)
 @x(~c;R)
@R

f(~c;R)  
yf
 1
< 0;
where the inequality is established by (1), (3), (46), and (60). Hence, from
(62), I obtain
d~n
dR
=
1
e
 d~c
dR
< 0;
d~
dR
=

yf
 d~c
dR
< 0:
I restate this result in the following proposition.
Proposition 4. In the permanent liquidity trap, where RD is stuck at (1 
)R, a reduction in the nominal rate of interest on excess reserves, R, in-
creases consumption, employment, and the price change rate.
This proposition is produced through the following mechanism. Since a re-
duction in R lowers RD (= (1  )R), the household is encouraged to shift its
portfolio from deposits to cash (from (46) a reduction in R raises the cash{
deposit ratio x(~c;R)). The rise in x(~c;R) works to lower the marginal utility
of cash vm(x(~c;R)) (i.e., it works to gratify the household's desire to hold
cash). This causes the household to increase consumption, and the increase
in consumption (aggregate demand) leads to increases in employment and
the price change rate.
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Note that naturally, in this permanent liquidity trap, a rise in the rate of
tax on vault cash,  , does not have any eects on consumption, employment,
or the price change rate. From (61) and (62), I have
d~c
d
= 0;
d~n
d
= 0;
d~
d
= 0:
Before going on to the next section, I summarize Propositions 1 and 3
in Figure 4. In Region (A) consisting of R >   and R < R, the normal
steady state exists. In Region (B) consisting of R >   and R > R, the
permanent liquidity trap appears. If R is lowered from Point A to Point
B in Figure 4, the economy moves from the permanent liquidity trap to the
normal steady state. Then, if R is lowered from Point C to Point D in Figure
4, what state does the economy reach? To answer this question, in the next
section, I analyze the case of
R <  :
6 Ineectiveness of Negative Interest Rate
Policy
This section rst derives the dynamic system in the case of R <   . It
then shows that the normal steady state also exists in Region (A) composed
of R <   and R >   in Figure 5 and that there exists the permanent
liquidity trap, where RD is stuck not at (1  )R but at  (1  ) , in Region
(C) composed of R <   and R <   in Figure 5. Moreover, it investigates
the eects of a fall in R and a rise in  .
If R <   , from (22), the lower bound on RBt is   (not R):
RBt    > R:
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Since the return on excess reserves is lower than that on government bonds
(R < RBt ), from (21), the commercial bank does not hold excess reserves:
M bt   Dt = 0:
Moreover, from (21), the following two cases are possible:
RBt >   and Zt = 0;
RBt =   and Zt > 0:
In the case where the government bond rate is higher than its lower
bound (RBt >  ) and where the commercial bank does not hold vault cash
(Zt = 0), from (20) where t > 0 and t > 0, the nominal deposit rate is
higher than  (1  ) :
RDt = (1  )RBt >  (1  ): (64)
In this case, because of Zt = 0 and M
b
t   Dt = 0, the dynamic system is
given by (33), (39), and (40) with (41).
In the case where the government bond rate is stuck at its lower bound
(RBt =  ) and where the commercial bank holds vault cash (Zt > 0), the
money market equilibrium condition (35) is modied as follows:
mht +m
b
t + zt = mt; (65)
where zt is real vault cash holdings. However, the law of motion ofmt remains
(39). Meanwhile, the law of motion of ct, (40), is modied; the cash{deposit
ratio xt is no longer (41) or (43) as follows. In the case of R
B
t =   and
Zt > 0, from (20) where t > 0 and t = 0, the nominal deposit rate equals
 (1  ) :
RDt = (1  )RBt =  (1  ): (66)
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From the second equality of (10) with (66):
vm(xt)
u0(ct)
=  (1  ) + vd(xt)
u0(ct)
;
xt in (40) is given by a function of ct and   :
xt = x(ct; ); (67)
where x(ct; ) is the same as obtained by replacing R of x(ct;R) in (43)
with   . Thus, when RBt =   and Zt > 0, the dynamic system consists
of (33), (39), and (40) with (67). Note from (64) and (66) that regardless of
whether Zt = 0 or Zt > 0, the following equation holds:
RDt = (1  )RBt
and that the lower bound on RD is  (1  ) (not (1  )R):
RDt   (1  ) > (1  )R:
Now, I examine what steady states exist if R <   . When
+  >
vm(x(c
; ))
u0(c)
; (68)
from (33), (39), and (40) with (41), there exists the same normal steady state
as the one represented by (47) in Section 4:
b = b;  =  = 

c + g   y
yf

; +  =
vm(x
)
u0(c)
:
As in Section 4, there exists the cash{deposit ratio x that satises +  =
vm(x
)=u0(c). However, x satises
x < x(c; )
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instead of (50). Therefore, RD and RB equal the natural nominal interest
rates and satisfy
RD =
vm(x
)
u0(c)
  vd(x
)
u0(c)
= (1  )R >  (1  ) = vm(x(c
; ))
u0(c)
  vd(x(c
; ))
u0(c)
;
RB =
RD
1   = R
 >  
instead of (51) and (52). Since (68) is necessary and sucient for R >   as
(49) is necessary and sucient for (52) (see Lemma 1), I obtain the following
proposition.
Proposition 5. In Region (A) in Figure 5:
R <  ; R >  ;
there exists the normal steady state represented by (47).
Next, I consider the case of
+  <
vm(x(c
; ))
u0(c)
: (69)
In this case, for the normal steady state to be attained, RD and RB must fall
below the respective lower bounds:  (1   ) and   , as inferred from the
discussion at the outset of Section 5. Since this is not feasible, the normal
steady state does not exist, and a permanent liquidity trap appears. However,
RB and RD are stuck not at R and (1  )R but at   and  (1  ) . From
(33), (39), and (40) with (67), this liquidity trap is characterized by
b = b;
_m
m
=   =  

c+ g   y
yf

> 0; +

c+ g   y
yf

=
vm(x(c; ))
u0(c)
;
(70)
which is the same as obtained by replacing R of (58) in Section 5 with   .
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As in Section 5, the value of c satisfying the last equation of (70), denoted
by c^, uniquely exists so as to satisfy
0 < c^ < c
when in addition to (69) the following holds:27
+ 

g   y
yf

>
vm(x(0; ))
u0(0)
= 0;

yf
< f(c^; ) (71)
instead of (59) and (60). Therefore, taking into account that (69) is necessary
and sucient for R <   as (56) is necessary and sucient for (57), I obtain
the following proposition.
Proposition 6. In Region (C) in Figure 5:
R <  ; R <  ;
there exists the permanent liquidity trap represented by (70).
In this liquidity trap, because of RB =   > R, the commercial bank does
not hold excess reserves but holds vault cash. Hence, from (2), (19), (25),
and (65), the money multiplier also decreases to one:28
Mh +D
M
=
(mh=d) + 1
(mh=d) + (mb=d) + (z=d)
=
x(c^; ) + 1
x(c^; ) + + 1   = 1:
27x(ct; ), as well as x(ct;R) with R < 0 in (44), satises
x(0; ) =1:
28From (2), (19), (25), and (65), z and d are
z =
(1  )m  [x(c^; ) + ]b
1 + x(c^; ) =1; d =
m+ b
1 + x(c^; ) =1;
which implies that
z
d
= lim
m!1
1    [x(c^; ) + ](b=m)
1 + (b=m)
= 1  :
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From (36) and (37), as in Section 5, the consumption deciency (c^ < c)
reduces employment n^ and the price change rate ^ to less than the levels of
the normal steady state:
n^ =
c^+ g
e
<
c + g
e
= n; ^ = 

c^+ g   y
yf

< 

c + g   y
yf

=  = :
(72)
From (70) and (72), the eects of increases in g and  are the same as those
in Section 5.29 Moreover, as shown below, although the eects of a reduction
in R and a rise in  are in contrast to those in Section 5, lowering the nominal
deposit rate remains important for boosting the economy.
Proposition 7. When RD is stuck at  (1   ) , a change in the nominal
rate of interest on excess reserves, R, has no eect:
dc^
dR
= 0;
dn^
dR
= 0;
d^
dR
= 0:
This is because a change in R does not aect RD (the lower bound on RD is
no longer (1  )R). By contrast, a rise in  lowers RD (=  (1  )), which
raises the cash{deposit ratio (@x(c^; )=@ > 0) and reduces the marginal
utility of cash (v0m(x(c^; )) < 0).30 This stimulates consumption, which
reduces unemployment and raises the price change rate, as stated in the
following proposition.
29From (70), (71), and (72), I obtain
dc^
dg
=
=yf
f(c^;R)  (=yf ) > 0;
dn^
dg
=
1
e

dc^
dg
+ 1

> 0;
d^
dg
=

yf

dc^
dg
+ 1

> 0;
dc^
d
= 0;
dn^
d
= 0;
d^
d
= 0:
30From (67), I obtain
@xt
@
=
(1  )u0(ct)
v0d(xt)  v0m(xt)
> 0:
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Proposition 8. When RD is stuck at  (1   ) , a rise in the rate of tax
on vault cash,  , increases consumption, employment, and the price change
rate:
dc^
d
=  v
0
m(x(c^; ))
u0(c^)
 @x(c^; )
@

f(c^; )  
yf
 1
> 0;
dn^
d
=
1
e
 dc^
d
> 0;
d^
d
=

yf
 dc^
d
> 0:
Finally, I summarize Propositions 1, 3, 5, and 6 in Figure 6 to analyze
the eectiveness of a reduction in R and a rise in  as a way of getting the
economy out of the permanent liquidity trap.
Proposition 9. If the natural nominal interest rate is higher than the lower
bound set by the presence of vault cash (R >  ), a reduction in the nom-
inal rate of interest on excess reserves, R, can move the economy from the
permanent liquidity trap to the normal steady state (the economy moves from
Region (B) to Region (A) in Figure 6). If the natural nominal interest rate
is so low that R <   , a reduction in R cannot pull the economy out of
the permanent liquidity trap (the economy that escapes Region (B) reaches
Region (C) in Figure 6).
If the rate of tax on vault cash is raised from  to  , then Point A in Region
(C) in Figure 6 moves to Region (A) in Figure 7. Meanwhile, Point B in
Region (C) in Figure 6 moves to Region (B) in Figure 7, and therefore a
reduction in R becomes able to move the economy at Point B to Region (A).
I restate this result in the following proposition.
Proposition 10. A rise in the rate of tax on vault cash,  , moves the econ-
omy from the permanent liquidity trap to the normal steady state or revives
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the ability of a reduction in R to get the economy out of the permanent liq-
uidity trap.
It turns out from Figure 7 that a high natural nominal interest rate, a low
nominal rate of interest on excess reserves, and a high rate of tax on vault
cash prevent the economy from falling into the permanent liquidity trap.
7 Conclusion
Using a dynamic general equilibrium model where cash and deposits provide
utility, nominal wages are sticky, excess bank reserves bear negative interest,
and a tax is levied on vault cash, this paper analyzes the eects of a negative
interest rate policy in a permanent liquidity trap where decient aggregate
demand creates unemployment, excess reserves arise, the money multiplier
declines to one, and an increase in the monetary base is ineective. If the
natural nominal interest rate is above the lower bound set by the presence
of vault cash, a reduction in the nominal rate of interest on excess reserves
can reduce the nominal deposit rate to the level of the natural nominal in-
terest rate and can get the economy out of the permanent liquidity trap.
By contrast, if the natural nominal interest rate is below the lower bound,
the nominal deposit rate does not decline to the level of the natural nom-
inal interest rate and is stuck at the lower bound no matter how negative
the nominal rate of interest on excess reserves is. Therefore, in this case,
we cannot pull the economy out of the permanent liquidity trap by lowering
the nominal rate of interest on excess reserves. Instead, a rise in the rate
of tax on vault cash is useful for helping the economy escape the permanent
37
liquidity trap because a decline in the lower bound caused by a rise in the
tax rate allows the nominal deposit rate to fall to the level of the natural
nominal interest rate.
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Figure 2: Case of (56)
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Figure 3: Consumption deciency c   ~c (> 0) in the case of R  0
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Figure 4: (A) normal steady state and (B) permanent liquidity trap (RD =
(1  )R)
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Figure 5: (A) normal steady state and (C) permanent liquidity trap (RD =
 (1  ))
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Figure 6: (A) normal steady state, (B) permanent liquidity trap (RD =
(1  )R), and (C) permanent liquidity trap (RD =  (1  ))
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Figure 7: Eect of a rise in the rate of tax on vault cash
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